Update, 11 November 2026, 01:13 Asia/Gaza
Related: the Across Protocol domain hijack (10 November 2026), another wallet drain that came from outside the chain: see Across Protocol Hack: How a Registrar Social-Engineering Attack Turned across.to Into a Wallet Drainer, and the Domain Hijacking Checklist Gulf and Egypt Crypto Apps Need.
Direct answer: The Keplr wallet hack reports concern some accounts created with Google or Apple login. Keplr has paused those login methods and tells users not to add funds or re-import or recreate those accounts. Its initial assessment says recovery-phrase and hardware-wallet accounts are not affected. Web3Auth confirms a security issue; the full technical cause and final losses remain unconfirmed.
Verified 7 November 2026. All times below are Asia/Gaza (UTC+2). This is a developing incident, not a completed forensic postmortem.
Key facts, not a damage estimate
- Web3Auth acknowledged an issue affecting services used by some third parties and paused the embedded wallet service.
- Keplr reported unauthorized transactions and published account-specific precautions.
- Josh Lee attributes the origin to Web3Auth, not Keplr’s code; his scope estimate is preliminary.
- Google and Apple are login methods in these notices. There is no verified finding here that either identity provider was breached.
- Do not confuse affected accounts, accounts actually exploited and confirmed funds lost. They are different measures.

What the official statements actually establish
The first verified Web3Auth statement was posted at 23:13 on 6 November. Keplr followed at 06:38 on 7 November. At 10:29, Lee wrote that the incident originated at the provider Keplr uses. He put the early affected-account estimate at about 20% of Google/Apple-login accounts and said only a fraction of that group appeared to have been exploited. He also said remaining accounts may be recoverable. These are attributed initial findings, not independently audited statistics or a promise of reimbursement.
The denominator matters: 20% does not mean one in five of all Keplr wallets lost funds. Nor does “may be recoverable” mean assets already stolen will be returned. We are not presenting circulating dollar amounts as confirmed losses because the primary statements checked for this report do not validate a final total.
Verified timeline and scope
| Time, Asia/Gaza | Primary source | What it supports |
|---|---|---|
| 6 Nov, 23:13 | Web3Auth X notice | Security issue; service pause; no initial evidence of MetaMask user impact. |
| 7 Nov, 06:38 | Keplr X notice | Unauthorized-transaction reports; social login paused; user precautions. |
| 7 Nov, 10:29 | Josh Lee statement | Provider origin claimed; preliminary scope and possible recovery. |
| 7 Nov, 11:28 | MetaMask developer announcement | Confirms embedded-wallet service pause and initial no-evidence statement. |
This timeline is an editorial visual based on the linked statements, not an estimate of when exploitation began. The Web3Auth status event separately labels Login Service maintenance as a security-incident precaution. Its displayed maintenance window must not be treated as the attack window or a guaranteed restoration deadline.
Is there a Web3Auth postmortem yet?
We checked Web3Auth’s status event, its public blog endpoint, the MetaMask news listing and developer announcement, and Keplr’s blog. No completed postmortem for this social-login event was found in the accessible pages at this check. The Web3Auth blog endpoint returned HTTP 401, so absence there could not be verified. A MetaMask user update dated 5 November discusses infrastructure access identified on 28 September and staking validators. It is a separate incident, not a postmortem for today’s Keplr reports. Do not merge its numbers or conclusions into this story.
Gulf and Egypt user protection checklist
- Identify how the affected account was originally created. An app on the same phone can hold accounts with different origins; the presence of the Keplr extension alone does not classify every account.
- For Google/Apple-created Keplr accounts, stop new deposits, recurring transfers and payments into that address. Tell a sender through a known channel not to fund it while guidance is pending.
- Do not re-import or recreate the affected account in another app, and do not follow a “migration” link in a reply, Telegram group or WhatsApp message. This follows Keplr’s explicit guidance rather than assuming moving wallets repairs a key.
- Keep public addresses, transaction hashes, amounts, chain names and local timestamps in a private incident log. Never put a recovery phrase, private key, OTP or cloud-login password into a support ticket.
- Check activity through a known explorer in read-only mode. Reading a transaction does not require connecting a wallet or signing a recovery message. Separate a failed login from a confirmed unauthorized transfer.
- Treat Arabic-language recovery advertisements and impersonated support accounts as hostile. An official-looking logo and a small upfront fee are not evidence of an authorized recovery service.
- If an exchange or payment counterparty is involved, contact its verified support with public transaction evidence. Preserve any case number; do not assume a freeze, reversal or compensation is available.
- Wait for account-specific official next steps. We are not issuing a blanket instruction to transfer assets, revoke approvals or rotate a login password as a proven fix for this still-investigated event.
For families and small businesses in Dubai, Riyadh or Cairo, the immediate operational task is to stop an old saved address being reused. Check payout templates, customer invoices and scheduled sends; avoid exposing your full balance or identity in public help groups. This is safety guidance, not a claim about local licensing or an instruction to buy crypto.
Embedded-wallet builders: separate identity, signing and recovery
A social sign-in is an onboarding interface; it is not a complete description of who can reconstruct a signing key. Teams building Arabic-first wallets should document the identity provider, wallet-service dependency, key-share control, session recovery and transaction authorization separately. This is a design and incident-response checklist, not a claim that any specific cryptographic mechanism caused this incident.
- Inventory provider integrations and classify accounts by creation and recovery method, with counts held internally until validated. Do not silently mark the entire user base compromised.
- Use a server-controlled emergency banner and deposit warning that work even when social login is unavailable. Test Arabic RTL, narrow screens and screen-reader text.
- Pause only the relevant flows through an approved incident runbook. Record who can activate and reverse the kill switch; retain logs before changing configuration.
- Ask the vendor for the affected networks, time range, signing exposure, containment evidence and account-level remediation. A service-restored flag is not proof that existing keys are safe.
- Review key-export and recovery designs in a controlled test environment. Do not ask production users to paste keys into a web form or switch networks as a speculative workaround.
- Prepare separate messages for login unavailable, account potentially exposed and unauthorized transaction confirmed. Include a timestamp, scope qualifier and the next update channel in English and Arabic.
- Have security and legal owners assess reporting duties against the actual product, jurisdiction, contracts and data involved. No regulator deadline or custody exemption is asserted here without a checked primary rule.
The vendor-risk pattern — with important differences
The lesson is to examine the boundary between the application and a specialist provider, not to equate every vendor incident. Contact-data exposure, a stolen integration token and unauthorized wallet signing can demand very different responses. Read our related incident coverage below for context, not as evidence that the same attacker or technical weakness is involved.
Frequently asked questions
Was Keplr hacked?
Keplr confirmed reports of unauthorized transactions in some accounts created with Google or Apple login. Josh Lee says the incident originated at Web3Auth, not Keplr code. The technical root cause has not been published in the verified notices.
Are recovery-phrase and hardware-wallet accounts affected?
Keplr’s initial assessment says accounts created with a recovery phrase or hardware wallet are not affected. This is an incident-specific assessment, not a guarantee against phishing or other unrelated risks.
What should Google or Apple login users do now?
Follow Keplr: do not add funds, do not re-import or recreate the account anywhere, and ignore recovery messages and links. Login is paused. Wait for verified next steps rather than improvising a migration.
Did Google or Apple get hacked?
The verified statements do not establish a compromise of Google or Apple. These names identify the account-creation method; Lee attributes the incident to Web3Auth.
How much was stolen and what does 20% mean?
No verified final loss total is established by these primary notices. Lee’s roughly 20% is an early estimate of affected social-login accounts, not all Keplr users, and he says only a fraction of that group was actually exploited.
Are MetaMask users affected by the Web3Auth hack?
Web3Auth and the MetaMask developer announcement say an initial investigation found no evidence that MetaMask users were impacted. This is not a final forensic report and does not identify every affected third party.
Can I recover funds or fix this by revoking approvals?
Recovery is not guaranteed. Lee says some remaining accounts may be recoverable. Revoking a token allowance cannot by itself repair a compromised signing key, and Keplr has not instructed users to connect to an emergency recovery site.
Primary sources and update policy
- Keplr user notice
- Web3Auth statement
- Josh Lee initial findings
- MetaMask developer announcement
- Web3Auth status event
We will revise scope, remediation and any loss total only when attributable evidence supports them. No exploit code, proof-of-concept link or unverified recovery service is included.
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